System and life-world, or systems and systemic environments? Reflections on the social and political theories of Habermas and Luhmann by Schecter, Darrow
 1 
Festschrift for Jürgen Habermas 
 
 
 
 
System and Life-world, or Systems and Systemic 
Environments?  Reflections on the Social and Political 
Theories of Habermas and Luhmann 
 
 
 
 
There are a number of plausible approaches to understanding the distinction 
between system and life-world that is so central to Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action and key, too, for a thorough understanding of his ideas on historical evolution and 
political legitimacy.  In part the distinction is a response to Weber’s musings on 
disenchantment and the Weberian thesis that the promise of Enlightenment reason 
inexorably becomes, in the course of industrialisation and democratisation, the reality of 
ubiquitous rationalisation.  Habermas insists that Weber’s view of rationalisation is too 
one-sided and to a considerable extent obsolete when one considers the complexity and 
diversity of modern society.  According to this interpretation the rationalisation and 
disenchantment theses are part of the epistemological dead weight that the idealist 
tradition in Germany passes on to Marx and then Weber, though of course Habermas also 
sees a markedly Nietzschean dimension in Weber’s reflections on legal-rational 
legitimation.  Habermas maintains that Weber forfeits the potential explanatory capacity 
of his ideas on rationalisation by seeing it at work everywhere, such that it becomes a 
kind of sociologically refracted cultural pessimism rather than sociology proper.  In the 
course of his development as a thinker Habermas comes to the view that many of the 
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most damaging methodological problems in the work of Marx and Weber are integrated 
into the main body of ideas of the first generation of critical theorists, and that these 
problems can also be found, in different guises, in the ontological, republican and post-
structural critiques of instrumental reason.  Hence from early on in his theoretical 
trajectory, he sets out to theorise action in the rigorously interactive and social terms 
demanded by the `linguistic turn’ in social and political thought referred to at the end of 
the first volume of the Theory of Communicative Action.1   
His counter argument is that although instrumental reason does indeed shape 
some of the un-democratic steering mechanisms operative in modern industrial societies - 
especially those processes propelled by money and power - these societies are also 
capable of generating and indeed must generate forms of communicative rationality 
which enable them to deal with social complexity in ways that also facilitate integrative 
political participation.  That is, whilst instrumental rationality in practice tends to 
marginalise, exploit, and coercively reconcile, communicative rationality enables the 
citizens of modern states to reach understandings on democratic principles of 
organisation and inclusion, and, moreover, these understandings are not strategic 
compromises reducible to the zero-sum adjudication of socio-economic conflicts.  
Without disputing the non-instrumental character of aesthetic reason, Habermas seeks to 
establish the reality of politically and normatively relevant non-instrumental 
communication against what he regards to be the implicit irrationalism that post-
                                                 
1 Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action), Volume I, pp. 531-2. 
Habermas actually calls this development the communicative-theoretical turn of social and political theory 
(p. 531), which is now widely referred to in the English-speaking world as the linguistic turn.  See too 
Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handels (Preliminary and 
Complementary Studies of the Theory of Communicative Action, 1984) Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1995, chapter 
4.  Interesting in the context of Habermas’ call for a move beyond Marx, Weber and the impasses of first 
generation of critical theory is what seems to be an almost total disregard for the work of Simmel.  
 3 
structuralist thinkers like Foucault and Derrida allegedly pick up from Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, and the forlorn retreat to aesthetics he sees in Adorno.  At the same time, 
whilst striving to address the sociological deficit in first generation critical theory, he 
refuses to endorse the implicit post-normativity in Niklas Luhmann and systems theory.2  
As will be explained below, Luhmann poses particularly difficult problems for 
Habermas’ distinction between life-world and system.  The comparison between 
Habermas and Luhmann will form the basis of this chapter.   
 
 
System, Life-World, and their Difficult Mediation: 
Introductory Remarks 
 
 
For Habermas reason is internally differentiated, such that whilst some forms of 
institutionalised reason marginalise, others integrate and reconcile on a non-coercive 
basis.  Indeed, it is this internally differentiated reality of institutionalised reason that 
harmonises instrumental, systemic reason with civic, communicative reason.  Central to 
his mature writings is the residually Hegelian claim that strategic constellations of power 
and historically evolved structures of need connected with private law and the division of 
labour are operative in civil society.  In a parallel vein, civic communication, when 
                                                 
2 Habermas, Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung (Truth and Justification), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1999, pp. 250-3, 
and Kommunikatives Handeln und detranszendierte Vernunft (Communicative Action and de-
transcendentalised Reason), Stuttgart, Reclam, 2001, p. 2001, pp. 8-10.  The title of the second book is 
significant in that it captures a central aspect of Habermas’s overall project: the “de-transcendentalisation” 
of Kant and of reason generally can in theory provide the bases of a theory of this-worldly rationality 
against the claims of the philosophy of consciousness and metaphysics.  It is not Hegelian reason in history, 
or the state as mind objectified, as such.  It is the reason embodied in the speech acts of partners in dialogue 
which, he suggests, is teleologically oriented toward mutual understanding and agreement.     
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properly channelled, underpins the workings of public law and the state.  Hence a crucial 
difference between Habermas and Luhmann concerns their respective conceptions of 
mediation.  Habermas believes that the life-world (and sometimes civil society in later 
writings) mediates between socially interacting individuals and political authority.  
Although the structure of communication is pyramidal, it flows openly in ways that 
guarantee maximum transparency and accountability.  As will be seen presently, he 
attributes crucial importance to the public sphere in this regard.  The state therefore 
retains a kind of vertically structured political primacy over the contractual, strategic, and 
professional calculations that predominate in civil society – it is patently more and other, 
in qualitative terms, than a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a thoroughly 
disenchanted world in which power is the ultimate reality principle.  Weber’s theory of 
rationalisation is radicalised by thinkers as diverse as Schmitt, Lukács, Benjamin, and, to 
a certain extent, by Heidegger.  In opposition to these and other opponents, Habermas 
seeks to re-articulate what he calls ‘the unfinished project of modernity’ by defending a 
significantly modified version of the Enlightenment concept of reason.  It can be argued 
that he offers convincing responses to the overwhelming majority of the aforementioned.  
It is however less clear that Habermas has adequate answers to some of the more pressing 
questions posed by Luhmann and Luhmann’s investigations into the political and 
normative implications of functional differentiation (FD).  It is striking, by way of 
introduction, to note a fundamental difference between Habermas and Luhmann 
regarding the fundamental issues of communication and mediation, and illuminating, as 
well, to consider key ambiguities in their respective positions in this regard.  As stated, 
for Habermas the pyramidal structure of communication between citizens and the modern 
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state flows openly in ways that guarantee maximum transparency and accountability.  
Luhmann challenges this model with his thesis that communication in modern society 
flows according to consistently horizontal patterns.  So whilst Habermas retains an 
implicitly hierarchical model of the ways in which politically relevant information is 
channelled, he is nonetheless adamant that it is structured by significant citizen input and 
democratic control.   His more recent works stress that citizen input of legal and political 
significance is now being channelled along transnational lines.3  
Luhmann abandons the hierarchical model.  But he does not do so in the name of 
the enhanced political legitimacy that in principle might be institutionalised through 
rigorously horizontal authority.  In fact, a close reading of Soziale Systeme, Die 
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Die Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts, and Die Politik der 
Gesellschaft raises the question as to where, if anywhere, democratic political authority is 
to be located in late modernity for Luhmann.  According to a strict systems-theoretical 
reading, the political system is merely one of many discrete, self-referential social 
systems, with no discernible legislative primacy over other systems, and no particular 
sovereign power.  One will not find any theory of the demos or pouvoir constituant in 
Luhmann.  The principal ambiguity that will be addressed below thus concerns the 
political implications of their respective conceptions of life-world, system, and systemic 
environments.  Habermas is happy to acknowledge that systemic realities exist and are 
part of what it means to live in a post-traditional, functionally differentiated society.  But 
in his work following the publication of Legitmationsprobleme, he does not seem to think 
                                                 
3 Habermas, ‘Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und die Legitimationsprobleme einer verfassten 
Weltgesellschaft’, in Philosophische Texte Band 4: Politische Theorie, Frankfurt, Studienausgabe 
Suhrkamp, 2009, pp. 402-424, and Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay (On Europe’s Constitution, 2011), 
fifth edition, Berlin Suhrkamp, 2014, pp. 62-74.   
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that systems can ever definitively interrupt the active mediations between the life-world 
and political authority.  He repeatedly maintains that it is this bond that distinguishes a 
democratic state of law from an arbitrary, authoritarian state; he also thinks that it is this 
same bond that distinguishes an actually functioning democratic state of law from what 
he takes to be Luhmann’s fanciful vision of a self-governing society of mutually 
adjusting social systems.4  Hence the question arises: what is the real evidence for the 
claim that twenty-first century democracies are characterised by the mediated unity of 
citizens and states through law and the public sphere?  The power of the institutions of 
international governance, such as that recently witnessed in Greece and elsewhere, as 
well as the renewed spectre of populism, suggest that Habermas may have greatly 
overestimated the extent to which the life-world and public sphere harbour special 
reservoirs of politically influential communicative reason.  Luhmann’s position is 
similarly beset with problems, in that it is not clear what role politics or the state has to 
play in a social reality in which there is no life-world or civil society to speak of, but only 
systems and their environments.   It is time to examine some of the issues that might 
emerge from a non-polemical exchange between these two prolific observers of political 
and sociological modernity.5  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1998, chapters 4-5. 
5 In 1974 Habermas and Luhmann co-authored Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie – was 
leistet die Systemforschung?  But little emerges in terms of dialogue: the theories of communicative action 
and social systems are expounded without much reference to each other.  Since then, and up until 
Luhmann’s death in 1998, their explicit references to each other’s work have been terse and elliptic.  See 
Habermas and Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie – was leistet die 
Systemforschung?, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1974.  
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Kant and Habermas: the Public Sphere and Rational 
Political Authority  
 
 
Habermas’ interpretation of Kant’s ideas on the public sphere offers a good point 
of departure.  In his critique of Kant he grapples with two central theoretical and practical 
political problems.  First, how does one criticise liberal notions of universal legality and 
instrumentally rational legitimacy, without embracing irrational and communitarian 
versions of legitimacy?  Second, how might it be possible to avoid recourse to 
predominantly technical and redistributive measures, i.e., measures that can dispense with 
democracy if need be, to solve the problem of social order and political legitimacy?  
Marx thinks that communism is the answer to a series of very concrete and material 
questions about decision-making and conflict resolution in modern industrial society.  
Similarly, Habermas’ defence of democracy is neither purely pragmatic nor abstractly 
moral: to this extent both are students of Hegel.  Habermas is not a liberal, 
communitarian, or social democrat in any straightforward sense.  Hence his reflections on 
this question mark an attempt to stake out original terrain of potentially great importance.  
Whereas Kant seeks to rescue epistemology from the dead ends of empiricism and 
rationalism, Habermas is determined to rescue social scientific methodology from what 
he finds inadequate in first generation critical theory, Marxism, and systems theory.  This 
leads him to adopt a number of different positions vis-à-vis liberalism depending on the 
book he is writing and the historical period in which it is written.6  He is at times critical 
                                                 
6 Habermas’ (born in 1928) writings extend from the 1950s to the present, and cover a wide range of topics 
which, in addition to his theoretical works, include pedagogical issues concerned with the student 
movement in Germany and the constant debate over university reform there.  For a comprehensive 
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of liberalism in so far as it sacrifices the possibility of rational legitimacy to the socio-
economic needs of powerful private interests.  But at other times he is unequivocally 
apologetic of liberal democracy to the extent that he sees it as the only possible 
institutional means capable of salvaging what remains truly revolutionary in liberal 
doctrine: it champions the idea that government authority should be based on deliberation 
and discursively-mediated consensus rather than tradition, more and less harmonious 
aggregation of interest, constituent sovereign power, or the expedient requirements of 
functional order.  Hence his writings intimate that although one can criticise liberalism 
from a Marxist or assorted other standpoints, it is nonetheless ascendant liberalism’s 
original claims that must be made good in order to redeem the promise of Enlightenment 
and modernity.  Hence a brief word about the political claims of liberalism will be useful 
in order to foreground the introductory discussion of Habermas’ ideas on Kant, the public 
sphere and the life-world.  Habermas’ interpretation of Kant will help illuminate the 
theoretical terrain that separates him from Luhmann.7  
Liberalism would seem to have a virtual theoretical monopoly on political reason, 
which it articulates in terms of legality and legitimacy.  Bodies of thought which set out 
to critique liberalism often seem to be attacking reason altogether or, what amounts to 
something very similar from a liberal perspective, they seem to demand the 
                                                                                                                                                 
overview see the excerpts included in William Outhwaite (intro. and ed.), The Habermas Reader, 
Cambridge, Polity, 1996. Readers of German can consult the recently published Philosophische Texte in 5 
volumes (Frankfurt Suhrkamp, 2009), which comprise selections of his major writings on the following 
subjects: (1) the speech-theoretical foundation of sociology, (2) rationality and speech theory, (3) discourse 
ethics, (4) political theory (see footnote 3 above) and (5) the critique of reason.  Christian Schlüttter 
provides good summary of the contents of the five volumes in the Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 June, 2009, 
p. 35.  
7 If one had to categorise his social and political thought in recognisable terms, one might say that 
Habermas combines a commitment to political liberalism with aspects of critical theory, legal theory and 
communicative rationality.  For two excellent introductions, see William Outhwaite, Habermas; A Critical 
Introduction, Cambridge, Polity, 1994 (second edition 2009), and Gordon Finlayson, Habermas: A Very 
Short Introduction, Oxford, OUP, 2005.      
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institutionalisation of “higher”, more substantial forms of reason and solidarity, i.e., 
forms of reason for whose implementation the socio-economic, political and juridical 
conditions are not available.  From an enlightened liberal perspective, notions of a 
general will or the withering away of the state may be brilliant ideas, but the conditions 
for anything other than authoritarian and totalitarian versions of them are not realisable.  
They are not bad ideas, as such, but rather impossible ideals that seek to go beyond what 
reason, which is limited in its claims and capacities, permits.  For thinkers in the liberal 
tradition such as Kant, there is a clear distinction between the universal claims of reason 
formulated by ethically minded, private adult citizens, and positive legal public authority.  
For Kant, the private individual has a rational will with which he (and it is unequivocally 
a ‘he’ for Kant) is capable of formulating self-legislative maxims indicating universal 
principles of morally irreproachable conduct.  These maxims touch upon private matters 
of conscience, and are thus not enforceable by public institutions.  Positive laws are 
enforceable by the state because they regulate external behaviour rather than individual 
ethical choice.  Many liberals after Kant suggest that when a person violates the law, s/he 
infringes on someone else’s liberty in a way that is fundamentally asymmetrical to the 
neglect to perform an ethical duty.  The former is punishable, whereas the latter is not.  
That is, liberals tend to maintain that if the positive laws of the state were to dictate the 
terms of individual ethical duty, individual liberty would quickly disappear.  The 
consequence is that duty, individual morality, and conscience cannot be immediately 
conflated with government law and the demands of public order. 
Kant sees that leaving matters as such is inadequate, for if ethics and politics are 
irremediably kept apart, the law is likely to be devoid of ethical-epistemological content, 
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and the citizen has little in the way of compelling motivation to obey the state.  The 
parallel is the Hobbesian converse: once established, state authority need not be too 
concerned with citizens’ rights.  Kant wants to refute Hobbes, though without, crucially, 
fusing the discrete terms characteristic of liberal democratic thought, and without 
unifying the actual spheres of social life that are only partially mediated in actual liberal 
democratic practice.  Kant sees the possibility of a solution in a public sphere mediating 
between private and ethical individuals (internalised moral law), and the political 
authority of government (external regulatory law).  It is the possibility of this mediation, 
initially inspired by his reading of Kant, which Habermas takes up in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere.  Although the conclusions of that early work of 
socio-historical theory are cautious and some might even say quite pessimistic, Habermas 
never really abandons the claim that legitimate government in modern societies is 
underpinned by a non-instrumentally rational mediation of private-individual interests 
and public-political authority.  In his early writings he emphasises that failing this 
rational mediation, one has something much more closely approximating Weberian 
rationalisation than rational authority.  With the publication of Between Facts and Norms 
in 1992, Habermas jettisons his early scepticism about the capacity of modern industrial 
societies continually to renew and update their normative bases.  Normative renewal in 
this context means citizen capacity to reach consent and agreement about the laws they 
choose to govern their lives.  This takes him from Kant and to a certain extent Arendt’s 
theory of the public sphere, to a theory of the life-world indebted to Husserl and 
sociological phenomenology, and from there to a qualified celebration of the legal state.8 
                                                 
8 Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgelichen 
Gesellschaft (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, first published by Luchterhand in 1962), 
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Kant maintains that whilst individual private citizens are likely to be ignorant of 
public affairs and political matters, the members of a public constituted by an 
independent assembly of citizens are capable of mutually enlightening themselves 
through informed discussion and critical debate.  Two principles inform Kant’s ideas on a 
critical public mediating between morally autonomous individuals and the state.  First, 
and foreshadowing Habermas’ notion of the ideal speech situation, the individuals 
comprising the public are endowed with a rational will that is independent of all 
empirically existing institutions and experience.9  Kant’s formulation, which anticipates 
Rawls’ veil of ignorance, stipulates that in order for the will to be autonomous, it must 
constitute itself in abstraction from socio-economic and political macro-realities, and in 
abstraction from emotions, impulses, drives, needs and other historically conditioned 
micro-realities as well.  Kant’s point is that everyone has different needs and a different 
conception of happiness.  Hence demands to satisfy claims made in the name of needs 
and happiness are non-rational and, by extension, extra-legal: states entrusted with 
satisfying such claims act beyond the scope of what is rationally possible and legally 
universal.  They will therefore tend to lapse into authoritarian abuse of power.10  Second, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1990, pp. 180-95.  Hence whilst it is The Theory of Communicative Action (2 
volumes, 1981) that announces the advent of the linguistic turn, The Structural Transformation, 
Legitimation Crisis and The Theory of Communicative Action all express scepticism about the possible 
mediation of life-world knowledge and systemic steering.  As will be seen, Between the Facts and the 
Norms attempts to provide arguments explaining how this mediation is in fact achieved to a satisfactory 
degree in the modern Rechtsstaat.  To this extent the latter publication of 1992 can be likened to Habermas’ 
version of the Philosophy of Right.  More critical readers might liken it to The End of History and the Last 
Man, in that it that in Between the Facts and Norms he more or less declares the modern liberal democratic 
legal state to be the end station of political humanity’s journey to rational individual and collective 
autonomy.     
9 Habermas, Philosophische Texte, Volume 3, chapter 4, and Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus 
(Legitimation Crisis), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1973, part 3, chapter 1.   
10 Kant’s ideas prefigure those of Habermas here as well.  In his critique of the welfare state Habermas 
suggests that the corporatist compromise between labour unions, government and business associations is a 
failed response to the tendency of capitalist economies to undermine the conditions of legal universality.  
The epistemological dimension of law is diluted to insulate the political system from demands for social 
 12 
and foreshadowing Habermas’ partial assimilation of some of the key tenets of systems 
theory in the Theory of Communicative Action period, the critical reasoning and debate of 
an assembly of rational wills must take place in a sphere of freedom, i.e., not in a 
workplace, laboratory, or other context where a chain of command organised to solve 
technical tasks is more appropriate than an assembly of equals.  Kant openly excludes 
women, children and salaried workers from the public sphere because of their supposed 
lack of autonomy.  In his estimation they are emotionally and economically dependent, 
which means that if allowed to participate in public affairs, they are likely to embrace a 
politics of irrational need rather than a juridical politics of freedom and rational 
cognition.  If this happens, law is deprived of its epistemological dimension at the same 
time that the transcendence of natural and mechanical necessity is forfeited.  The 
economically independent, rational men in Kant’s public sphere are impartial ethical 
individuals who mediate between themselves and political authority by formulating 
principles in open arenas of the public sphere.  These discursively redeemed principles 
serve the purpose of confronting the representatives of political authority and positive law 
with ethically informed universal claims that legitimate authority cannot ignore.  In 
principle these claims should require positivised, formal law to adjust its contents, thus 
reconciling order and substantive reason.  Hobbes is therefore refuted in the same stroke 
that safeguards individual autonomy and moral obligation.11   
                                                                                                                                                 
equality that can really only be properly addressed by changing the law instead of “softening it”, so to 
speak, for softening the law undermines its capacity to set out rational grounds for political obligation.  See 
Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Legitimation Crisis), part 2, chapter 5.  Claus Offe 
makes related observations about legality and the long-term prospects of the welfare state in 
`Rationalitätskriterien der Administration’ in Leviathan, 3 (1974), pp. 333-45. 
11 Kant, `Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’ (What is Enlightenment?’, 1783) in Wilhelm 
Weischedel (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichstsphilosophie, Politik und 
Pädogogik I, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1977, pp. 57-61.  Relevant in this regard are the arguments that Kant 
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But what happens if public authority refuses to adjust the content of law making 
to the truths of discursive rationality?  Habermas, writing in the early 1970s and taking 
his cue from Kant, argues that a legitimacy crisis ensues.  The claim intrinsic to 
Habermas’ attempt to update Kant is that in modern states it is not so much a crisis 
concerning the distribution of wealth, status, security or other phenomena which can be 
administratively or technically supplied.  It is a crisis of the autonomy of reason and the 
epistemological integrity of law.  When forms of law are out of step with the truth 
content of reason, law forfeits the cognitive dimension that separates modern law from 
more antiquated and arbitrary instances of Diktat, privilege and tradition.  From the 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment vantage point championed by liberalism, these 
forms of domination should really be part of the past, and indeed, Kant believes that as 
the process of Enlightenment unfolds, substantive rationality and formal legality will 
harmonise to an increasingly greater extent, thus obviating the need for populist forms of 
legitimacy, civil disobedience and revolution.  In `An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?’, Kant intimates that where the law is underwritten by the cognitive 
content of reason, politics ceases to be the domain of power, privilege and ideological 
mendacity.  In the discursively redeemed speech claims of rational, ethically-oriented 
individuals in the public sphere, the promise of Enlightenment is redeemed, and as such, 
humanity need not live in fear of the whims of despots any longer.12 
Central to the argument developed in the Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere and subsequent works is that rather than representing a liberal utopia of political 
                                                                                                                                                 
puts forth in `Perpetual Peace’ and `On the Common Saying’.  These three and other important political 
essays are available in English in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge, CUP, 1970.       
12 Kant, `Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht in der Praxis’ 
(`Theory and Praxis’), in Wilhelm Weishedel (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Schriften zur Anthropologie, pp. 129-
30. 
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harmony secured under ideal conditions that never present themselves, Kant’s views on 
the public sphere reflect a sociologically-grounded possibility exhibited, to differing 
degrees, by actual tendencies in early modern industrial societies.  This is due to the in 
Habermas’ estimation historically corroborated fact that traditional ecclesiastical and 
aristocratic political authority was being challenged by theoretically sophisticated 
articulations of public opinion in coffee houses, universities, newspapers, and the then 
gentry-dominated citizen associations preceding the emergence of modern political 
parties.  In chapter 4, section 13 of the Structural Transformation, Habermas outlines 
Kant’s theory of the public sphere, noting that it is central to Kant’s argument that it is 
the task of the public sphere to harmonise the claims of morality and reason with those of 
law and politics.13  It is clear from the text that Habermas has much normative sympathy 
with the ideal of rational political legitimacy, and clear too that he has a firm scholarly 
conviction that, to paraphrase Marx, humanity only poses itself questions for which the 
solutions are immanently feasible.  This is to say that in contrast to the abstract, a-
historical approach adopted by analytical philosophers such as Rawls, Habermas seeks to 
ground his normative claims sociologically, which he initially does with historical 
documentation and sociological theory.  His later work supplements historical and 
sociological analysis with cognitive psychology, linguistics and legal theory.14 
The major question raised in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
is whether or not modern capitalist economies and extra-economic public spheres can 
                                                 
13 An issue that Habermas does not really address is that morality and reason also entail a natural right to 
private property for Kant.  The possible explanations as to why Habermas does not touch upon this are 
addressed in this chapter.     
14 Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere), 
pp.178-195, Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus (The Reconstruction of Historical 
Materialism), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1976, parts 2-3, and Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1985, chapters 1 and 11.     
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peacefully co-exist, or if, on the contrary, there is a marked tendency for the logic of 
commodity production to extend its jurisdiction into the cultural, political, and aesthetic 
spheres of communication and interpersonal understanding.  This is a fairly important 
query, since the status of the normative bases of the state is at stake.  Since the young 
Marx’s critique of Hegel’s theory of the modern state there has been much debate and 
real upheaval concerning the respective of roles of economy and polity (Luhmann would 
say economic system and political system) in the generation and resolution of social 
conflict.  Whilst it is very improbable that the state is `nothing other than an executive 
committee for managing the affairs of the entire bourgeoisie’, as Marx quips in the 
Communist Manifesto of 1848, it is also doubtful that the supposed political universality 
of citizenship, which in theory does not recognise differences of race, religion, class and 
other social factors, is not affected by patterns of property ownership or the systemic 
requirements of industrial production.  Mainstream liberal theorists tend to insist on the 
autonomy of politics from economics (insisting too, to varying degrees, on the primacy of 
private individual rights over public political rights), whilst Marxists question the degree 
to which there can be real political autonomy from socio-economic realities.  Like 
Arendt, therefore, Habermas suggests that both liberal and Marxist approaches are 
flawed.  He argues that in their legal institutions and public spheres, early modern 
societies have an historically unique capacity to generate discursive understanding of 
conflict.  The reflexivity induced by this reasoning makes the loci of conflict transparent, 
and, under ideal conditions, susceptible to critique and reform, thus echoing the Kantian 
claim that revolution and civil disobedience should in principle become superfluous.  
Central to the structural transformation thesis is the claim that this capacity is forfeited if 
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the spheres and institutions necessary for consensus are undermined by systemic 
processes of a bureaucratic and technical stamp.  Hence whilst the Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere is neither liberal nor Marxist, it leans toward a 
modified Marxist account of how the liberal dimension of liberal democracy can be 
undermined by capitalism.15   
This contributes to the originality and unusualness of the book: a Kantian-
Weberian-Marxist argument is deployed in order to critique the actual functioning of 
liberal democratic states as a part of a defence of liberal ideals.  Its author is committed to 
the postulate that rational agreement rather than bourgeois or working class power should 
be the basis of political legitimacy, and that modernity offers an unprecedented and non-
ideological possibility of converting that should into an is.  To this extent one discerns 
not merely the influence of Kant, Weber and Marx.  Habermas is also guided by 
Tocqueville’s intuition that some form of democracy is going to accompany the transition 
from feudal-agrarian to industrial-democratic society.  Hence the real question is not 
democracy versus some other form of government.  Habermas follows Tocqueville in 
asking: will it be a liberal or a despotic form of democracy?  Since both are conceivable 
and indeed possible, much is at stake depending on the robustness of the institutions 
mediating between private (commercial) and public (republican) forms of liberty.  
Tocqueville’s stress on the importance of corps intermédiares is echoed in some of 
Habermas’ reflections on the public sphere.  Moreover, Hegel’s influence is evident in 
the immanent dialectical methodology which stipulates that the solutions to normative 
                                                 
15 Habermas, 1990 introduction to Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere), pp. 33-50, and pp. 195-209 in the text.  The modified Marxism in question is clearly 
informed by close readings of Weber and Adorno at this early stage of Habermas’ development as a 
thinker.   
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`ought questions’ (Sollen, later Geltung) are to be sought in the `is realities’ (Sein, later 
Faktizität), that is, already existing institutions offer the key to reconciling what can and 
what should be done.16   
The thesis of structural transformations and constitutional transitions has a history 
within critical theory that needs brief attention in order fully to understand Habermas’ 
enormous contribution to social and political theory and adequately to appreciate what 
may be considered his departure from first generation critical theory.  In 1941 Institute 
for Social Research member Friedrich Pollock (1894-1970) attempted to theorise the 
transition from free market to late (sometimes also called state) capitalism, explaining 
that late capitalism introduces planning to co-ordinate supply and demand, though 
without thereby becoming a system of production based on the satisfaction of human 
needs or the desire for creative work.  State capitalism is thus not state socialism on the 
Soviet model, and certainly not libertarian socialism as Marx had envisaged when 
discussing human as opposed to merely political emancipation.  Late capitalism can be 
characterised instead as an attempt to anticipate and forestall demands for political 
control of the economy by stabilising economic processes through managerial planning 
rather than democratic participation in key decisions about production and investment.17  
Pollock’s ideas on the correlations between determinate stages in the evolution of 
                                                 
16 Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere), pp. 
209-24.  Although in the early to mid-1960s Habermas continues to rely on Marx, Weber, and Adorno, one 
can already see some of the characteristic lines of his mature thought starting to emerge.  He develops a 
critical stance toward the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists in that he remains sceptical toward 
the negative theological tendency to glimpse the conditions of a reconciled world in terms of their manifest 
absence (a tendency sometimes discernible in Adorno), and is also hesitant to attribute automatic radical 
political subjectivity to exploited groups and classes (a tendency often found in Marcuse).   He asserts that 
the task of completing the ongoing projects of Enlightenment and modernity turns on re-conceptualising 
reason without fully embracing or wholly ignoring the rationalisation thesis, keeping in mind the evident 
reality that one cannot simply re-institutionalise the bourgeois public sphere of early modernity under 
twentieth century conditions of universal franchise and mass society.              
17 Friedrich Pollock, `State Capitalism: its Possibilities and Limitations in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt 
(eds.), The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, London and New York, Continuum,1982, pp. 71-2. 
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capitalism and structural changes in forms of law and state are developed with great 
analytical precision by two legal theorists associated with the Institute for Social 
Research briefly touched upon in chapter 3, Otto Kirchheimer (1905-65) and Franz 
Neumann (1900-1954).  In `Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise’, also of 
1941, Kirchheimer shows that under late capitalism, the state executive is restructured so 
that it can perform key planning functions neglected by the market but nonetheless 
necessary to ensure the predominance of market relations in the economy and, crucially, 
in the polity as well.  Kirchheimer develops what one might call a juridical socialism 
which, like Pollock’s, parts with mechanical notions of base and superstructure, though 
without embracing the thesis that the political system and the economic system function 
independently in industrial society.  Part of his argument, which anticipates the 
colonisation of the life-world thesis developed by Habermas in Legitimation Crisis, is 
that the political re-structuring of capitalist social relations can occur because of a 
subjective factor related to class consciousness and culture, and an objective factor 
regarding systemic features of capitalist production.  Whereas the subjective factor 
contributes to a stalemate in the class struggle that creates possibilities for authoritarian 
intervention in the economy and repressive apparatuses of the state, the objective factor 
results in overproduction crises requiring Keynesian reform.  Kirchheimer reckons that it 
is possible to safeguard the integrity of law as a barometer of human freedom against the 
tendency for it to become a tool of class oppression when undermined by organised 
private interests.  This however depends, from a specific moment in the democratisation 
process set in motion by 1789 and 1848, on a transition from socially created wealth that 
is privately appropriated, to a new mode of production which ensures that the juridical 
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mediation of humanity and nature first sheds its class, and then eventually its bureaucratic 
character as well.18 
The implementation of Keynesian stop-gap measures tends to expand the role of 
the state executive at the expense of the legislature.  This helps undermine the democratic 
bases of the state, thus pointing the way to more and less authoritarian forms of 
corporatism.  The key point made by Kirchheimer which is taken up by Habermas in the 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and then again in Legitimation Crisis is 
that the move from market to late capitalism is accompanied by the transition from the 
potential of rational and ethical law to the reality of government by command and decree.  
Habermas sometimes refers to this development as Verrechtlichung, which can be 
thought of as the tendency to adopt legal solutions to various conflicts, without, however, 
respecting official legal channels and institutions.  This development is of course most 
obvious in the transition from parliamentary democracy to fascism.  But that very 
spectacular and visible collapse of the liberal dimension of liberal democracy points the 
way toward an ostensibly more benign phenomenon with related origins, which is the 
blurring of the public/private divisions in post-World War II consumer-welfare capitalism 
analysed by Arendt.   Whilst Arendt stresses the demise of politics in her Aristotelian-
republican sense that this blurring brings in its wake, Kirchheimer points out the 
inevitable conflict between the possible transition from socially created wealth that is 
privately appropriated to socially created wealth that is socially appropriated, on the one 
hand, and the thwarting of that democratic and pluralist possibility by various attempts to 
insulate the prerogatives of capital from legal-rational critique, on the other.  What unites 
                                                 
18 Otto Kirchheimer, `Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise’ in Arato and Gebhardt (eds.), The 
Essential Frankfurt School Reader, pp. 52-7. 
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Arendt and Kirchheimer’s otherwise very different standpoints is the observation that at 
first glance fascist and authoritarian corporatism more generally seems to be the problem 
of inter-war Europe.  Yet a closer look suggests that there is a more fundamental clash 
between the imperatives of critical reason and the instrumental logic of capital 
accumulation.  This clash is not easily patched up by staging a return to forms of state 
which correspond to earlier, now outdated models of equilibrium between class structure, 
mode of production, and mode of political compromise.  Historically stable liberal 
democratic states may well manage to manoeuvre past the authoritarian transition to a 
new mode of political compromise in the 1920s and 1930s, but the transition will 
eventually have to be made in some form, as the institutions bourgeois ascendancy, such 
as the public sphere, evolve into those of bourgeois maturity and mass electorates.  Hence 
in Kirchheimer’s view one must update Tocqueville’s question about democracy as 
follows: will it be a juridical socialist or a despotic form of democracy? 19  
Kirchheimer explains that in looking at the history of European states from 1848 
to the National Socialist victory of 1933, one sees that steadily enhanced degrees of 
political enfranchisement are paralleled by very uneven patterns of social 
enfranchisement and disenfranchisement.  Political equality becomes a lever to pursue 
social equality, but this movement is halted to varying extents by private ownership of 
the means of production.  Each state is faced with the choice of either socialising private 
socio-economic rights in order to secure democratic legitimacy, or of enforcing liberal 
legitimacy by curtailing and in some cases banning democratic rights of citizenship.  If 
the latter choice is enacted, liberal democracy mutates into something palpably more 
                                                 
19 Otto Kirchheimer, `Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise’ in Arato and Gebhardt (eds.), The 
Essential Frankfurt School Reader, pp. 54-6. 
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authoritarian.  In `Changes in the Function of Law in Modern Society’, published in the 
Journal for Social Research four years prior to Kirchheimer’s article, Neumann explores 
the modalities of political transformation in relation to changes in the capitalist economy 
and industrial society, and suggests that the idea of law as an example of the collective 
rational will of the citizenry is bound up with a particular account of the origins and 
sources of secular authority, and, that such accounts vary with national context.  It is clear 
to him that the sources of authority evolve in history in conjunction with church/state 
relations, in a first time, and in conjunction with state/capital relations, in a second.  The 
conflicts ensuing from changing church-state and capital-state relations are different 
depending on a variety of historical and constitutional factors shaping the origins and 
development of each state’s path to industrialisation, and the specific kind of democracy 
that it adopts.  One of the lessons to be drawn from the history of the Weimar Republic is 
that democracy in anything more than a formal sense requires a significant degree of pre-
established social harmony and agreement about the rationality of fundamental 
institutions, such that it cannot be supposed that democracy will produce such stability, 
i.e., it is a political form of government that is dependent on a number of extra-
governmental factors, as Montesquieu was well aware.  The structure of markets, social 
classes, and public/private mediations is of course key.  Constitutional debate on these 
topics continues apace in the light of Brexit and other phenomena indicating that the 
transition to global democratic law is going to be anything but smooth.20 
Anticipating the ordo-liberalism of the West German Bundesrepublik in the post-
war period, Neumann shows that liberals too often assume that it is the role of the state to 
                                                 
20 Neumann, `Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft’ (`The Change in 
the Function of Law in Modern Society’, 1937), in Helge Pross (ed.), Franz Neumann: Demokratischer und 
autoritärer Staat, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1986, pp. 31-81.  
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create a legal framework for the protection of private interests.  The parallel assumption 
is that the play of private interests produces public liberty and democracy in the manner 
of an almost accidental by-product.  For Neumann freedom and democracy are terms 
referring to the rights and real capacity of citizens to make collective decisions and to 
participate in public life as equals.  Equality in this republican and deliberative sense is 
undermined by attempts to foil the logic of inclusive democratic enfranchisement by re-
forming economic and political processes so that capital is continually reallocated the 
privilege to control the labour process, albeit on new bases, in ways that are exempt from 
accountability.  On this rather accurate reading it is ideological to separate questions of 
reason and legitimacy from questions of freedom, political equality, democracy and, 
crucially, economic organisation. This point raises a recurrent question in the writings of 
Kirchheimer and Neumann that Habermas has had to face throughout his career: are 
liberalism and liberal democracy inextricably bound up with the predominance of private 
interests over general interests in modern industrial societies, or might there be a way of 
uniting liberal, republican and socialist tenets into a coherent alternative to liberalism, 
corporatist social democracy and state socialism?  Whilst Kirchheimer and Neumann are 
very clear as regards their respective positions in response, it will be seen that Habermas’ 
answer is considerably less clear.21 
                                                 
21 Neumann, `Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft’ (`The Change in 
the Function of Law in Modern Society’), in Pross (ed.), Franz Neumann: Demokratischer und autoritärer 
Staat.  Some of Neumann and Kirchheimer’s most important essays can be found in English in William E. 
Scheuerman (ed.), The Rule of Law under Siege: Selected Essays by Franz Neumann and Otto 
Kirchheimer, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996.  For two very good overviews of their main 
political and juridical ideas, see William Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt 
School and the Rule of Law, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994, and Chris Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern 
Germany, chapter 3.  The lack of clarity attributed to Habermas is not meant to suggest political 
opportunism on his part.  He is constantly revising his views in answer to his critics and responding to 
changing socio-economic and political conditions as well, such as the re-unification of Germany during 
1989-90.         
 23 
Habermas’s early work is quite markedly influenced by his readings of Arendt, 
Kirchheimer and Neumann, and their variously formulated conception of republican 
action and juridical politics.  It is marked too by Horkheimer and Adorno, for whom he 
worked as a research assistant at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt.  Needless 
to say he is also very well acquainted with the German idealist tradition, Nietzsche and 
Freud, and the sociology of Marx, Durkheim and Weber as well.  The author of the 
Structural Transformation and Legitimation Crisis has much sympathy with the ideas of 
Arendt, Kirchheimer, Neumann, and what one might call their strong conception of 
politics and a positive conception of freedom.  In his writings immediately after 
Legitimation Crisis, however, one detects a kind of Hegelian doubt about the possibility 
of eliminating instrumental rationality and institutionalised private interest from civil 
society.  The allusion to Hegel is appropriate because like the author of the Philosophy of 
Right, Habermas begins to argue that what liberals, Marxists avant la lettre and political 
republicans in different ways all overlook is that there is much more going on in civil 
society than systematic exploitation and the contractually-mediated pursuit of individual 
gain.  Habermas at times conflates public sphere, civil society, and life-world, and at 
other times seems to suggest that they refer to distinct institutional realities.22  In any case 
he follows Hegel in general terms by maintaining that modern societies generate pre-
                                                 
22 At times Habermas seems to be saying that the life-world exists within civil society, whilst at other times 
it appears that life-world and civil society are more or less interchangeable terms for him.  In the 1990 
introduction to the German edition of Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere he states that in the 
Theory of Communicative Action and subsequent works he analyses society as the dynamic unity of 
systems, propelled by money and power, and the life-world, which is maintained through communication.  
From the early 1990s on he favours the term civil society and the idea of plural public spheres rather than 
an overarching, unitary public sphere of the kind implied by the initial Kantian version adopted in the 
Structural Transformation.  As will be see what is really at stake is the rationalisation of the life-world 
which is not, he insists, to be confused with the Weberian notion of rationalisation taken up by Lukács, 
Adorno, et. al.  See the introduction to Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere), pp. 45-8.  
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government level forms of agreement and understanding that are not simply reducible to 
strategic compromise.  But Habermas goes well beyond Hegel’s modest claims for the 
forms of reason operative in the public sphere and civil society by arguing that modern 
states cannot successfully cope with social differentiation and complexity without such 
interaction and the symbolic meanings they transmit and sustain.23  Hence a brief word 
about the role of interaction in the argument developed in Knowledge and Human 
Interests (1968) will serve as a good introduction to the discussion of the roles played by 
communication and the life-world in the Theory of Communicative Action. 
 
 
From Labour and Interaction to Communicative Action 
 
 
 Along with the Structural Transformation and Legitimation Crisis, Knowledge 
and Human Interests is a key work on the road to the Theory of Communicative Action.  
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas introduces the distinction between labour 
and interaction, which prefigures the distinction between system and life-world appearing 
in later works.  It is somewhat curious that he does not explicitly refer to Arendt or the 
distinction between labour, work and action developed in the Human Condition (1957).  
Arendt regards action as the self-disclosure of individual citizens who appear in the 
public sphere as non-identical equals.  Action for her is thus plural, open-ended, political, 
                                                 
23 Hegel is actually quite dismissive of the public sphere, which he denigrates to the decidedly more 
pejorative status of public opinion in his mature writings.  See Die Philosophie des Rechts (The Philosophy 
of Right, 1821), paragraph 315, and Schecter, Sovereign States or Political Communities?, pp. 31-9. 
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and indicative of a specifically human capacity to transcend the more limited modes of 
freedom connected with labour and work.  Labour and work are more circumscribed 
because they are more closely bound to life and the life-cycle with its inevitable 
beginning, unfolding an end.  She intimated that there is, on the contrary, nothing 
inevitable about the outcomes of action.  This is because action transpires in the world, 
where humans - rather than causally determined nature - are the originators of new 
beginnings.  Central to her view of the world and the place of action within it is the view 
that each individual acts in a way that is unique.  Transcendence of the processes 
governing the life-cycle is thus not predicated on or synonymous with material 
abundance or technological prowess, which is why the ancient Greeks understood the 
distinction between worldly political action and vital economic growth in agriculture.  
Hence Arendt and Habermas make important claims for what one might call sub-
systemic politics, or politics considered independently from the dynamics of money and 
power, bearing in mind that prior to Between Facts and Norms, Habermas is more likely 
to use the terms ‘interaction’ and ‘communication’, rather than ‘politics’.   
 Whilst for Arendt politics creates spaces where uniqueness and singularity of 
perspective can be sustained in spontaneous and unpredictable ways that reveal 
fundamental aspects of the human condition, Habermas submits that the specifically 
human capacity exhibited in interaction and communication results in understanding and 
agreement.  Thus although they agree on the fundamental importance of the human 
faculty of speech, Arendt’s emphasis on pluralist politics and open-ended deeds is 
somewhat distinct from Habermas’ stress on discursive consensus.  Corresponding to this 
difference is Arendt’s generally disparaging view of society and social behaviour, which, 
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following Heidegger, she construes as conformist for the most part, and Habermas’s 
attempt to develop a theory of social action and an account of societal evolution which he 
finds missing in liberalism, Weber and Marxism.  If Arendt never strays too far from her 
version of Aristotelian republicanism, Habermas’s encounter with Anglo-American 
pragmatism and developmental psychology in Knowledge and Human Interests prompt 
him to seek paths beyond philosophical idealism, historical materialism and, it can be 
argued, away from the particular kind of critical theory represented by the main ideas of 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse.24  Although he never abandons the Kantian dimension 
of his thinking, which insists that substantive agreement constitute at least some essential 
part of legitimate democratic authority in the modern world, he supplements this political 
dimension with a sociological dimension oriented toward the explanation of social action 
in the life-world.  Hence in the transition from the Structural Transformation to 
Knowledge and Human Interests one can discern two shifts in emphasis.  The first is that 
from an ethically grounded notion of politics in the public sphere to a more sociologically 
grounded conception of interaction in the life world; the second is the evolution from 
critical theory to communicative theory. 
Habermas’ interaction represents a sociological equivalent of Arendt’s action, 
though with the notable difference that interaction produces forms of non-technological 
knowledge and agreement rather than acts of irreproducible singularity.  In making this 
argument Habermas follows Dilthey’s hermeneutic distinction between the human and 
                                                 
24 Whilst The Structural Transformation and Legitimation Crisis can be seen to share a number of the 
concerns and the methodology of the founders of critical theory, it is doubtful if the same can be said of 
Between the Facts and the Norms.  The difficulty of assessing Habermas’ relation to critical theory is 
compounded by the fact that there is no clear agreement as to what constitutes critical theory, and if critical 
theory should include deconstruction and post-structuralism.  For a good introduction see Raymond Geuss, 
The Idea of a Critical Theory, Cambridge, CUP, 1981.     
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natural sciences and C.S. Peirce’s (1839-1914) theory of pragmatic reason.  Whereas 
Arendt refers to the ontological difference between labour, work, and interaction, in 
Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas borrows Husserl’s use of the term 
transcendental to explain the categorical difference between the natural sciences, which 
generate technical interests in accordance with the dictates of mono-logic reason and 
classificatory knowledge, and the human sciences.  The human sciences generate 
practical knowledge as well as emancipatory interests on the basis of hermeneutic 
knowledge and dialogue that is not only oriented toward agreement, but in principle is 
receptive to radical otherness as well.25  Within this framework practical interest mediates 
between technical knowledge and emancipatory knowledge.  It is in the context of these 
fundamental distinctions that Habermas defends the university as an institution capable of 
facilitating communication between different socio-economic and political spheres, 
which he suggests that it does by furnishing the bases of critical social science and 
developing institutionalised modernist reflexivity more generally.  This position 
constitutes a critique of Marx which, as in the Structural Transformation, also adopts 
certain aspects of a Marxist critique of liberal democracy.  It is also an implicit critique of 
Adorno that nonetheless acknowledges the potential danger (as opposed to stifling 
omnipresence) of rampant instrumental reason.  Hence in Knowledge and Human 
                                                 
25 The idea that dialogue opens up the possibility of non-instrumental knowledge that is also non-scientific 
in the sense of the natural sciences has become a topic of considerable importance in social and political 
thought.  Whilst Habermas’ contribution comes in the form of his notion of the ideal speech situation 
discussed in Legitimation Crisis and elsewhere in his oeuvre, the theme can be found in many other recent 
and contemporary writers.   For some of the most famous examples, see Michael Theunissen, Das Andere: 
Studien zur Soziologie der Gegenwart (The Other), Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1977, Emmanuel Levinas, 
Le temps et l’autre (Time and the Other), Paris, PUF, 1983,  and Axel Honneth, Der Kampf um 
Anerkennung (The Struggle for Recognition), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1994.  The communicative affinities 
between the potential openness of dialogue and the epistemological dimensions of aesthetic experience are 
clearly discernible in the philosophies of Adorno and Derrida.  See Christophe Menke, Die Souveränität 
der Kunst: Ästhetische Erfahrung nach Adorno und Derrida, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1991.  
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Interests one discerns the initial formulation of Habermas’ mature work.  The apparently 
rigid dichotomies between political and human emancipation (Marx), private and public 
spheres (Arendt), as well as that between instrumental reason and mimetic reason 
(Adorno) are deconstructed.  What emerges is the thesis that a third term with roots in the 
reality of everyday life in society - interaction - can and to varying extents does perform 
important mediating functions between technical, practical, communicative and 
emancipatory forms of knowledge and the discrete but ultimately connected interests 
pertaining to the form of knowledge in question.26             
 Yet the early Habermas does not depart so far from Kirchheimer and Neumann as 
to say that the mediation processes are always smooth.  Indeed, as the latent crisis 
tendencies of industrial societies became more pronounced in the early 1970s (in some 
ways reminiscent of the situation at the time of this writing), he was compelled, however 
provisionally, to revise at least the emphasis of his argument.  Whilst continuing to insist 
on the different logics obtaining in the natural and human sciences, he also becomes 
aware of the fact that he would be abandoning critical theory altogether by construing the 
relation between work and interaction as spontaneously self-regulating, or, as Luhmann 
suggests, system-specific.  This would have placed him rather close to the postulates of 
sociological positivism and systems theory.  By extension, it would also place him close 
to the argument that political legitimation in modern societies can dispense with active 
citizen input, i.e., that legitimacy and stability are synonymous.  In Legitimation Crisis 
the argument in the Structural Transformation is slightly modified to explain the 
dysfunctional dynamics unleashed by flawed mediation processes.  These pathological 
processes become palpably visible when the life-world, which takes over the centrality 
                                                 
26 Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse (Knowledge and Human Interests), pp. 347-64. 
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enjoyed by the public sphere played in earlier books, is colonised by technological and 
instrumental imperatives stemming from the capitalist economy and state bureaucracies.  
The argument developed in Legitimation Crisis is that colonisation in the sense used here 
occurs when the channels relaying technical knowledge with hermeneutic knowledge 
become blocked.  One may regard this as a sociologically-informed modification of the 
Neumann-Kirchheimer thesis that law is transformed into decree if juridical institutions 
are hijacked by private economic concerns, in which case legal universality and general 
interests are hijacked by executive fiat and particular interests.  Whilst technical 
knowledge is bound up with instrumental reason and power, which in institutional terms 
constitute what Habermas from the 1970s onwards refers to as the system (rather than 
merely work, as in Knowledge and Human Interests), hermeneutic knowledge is linked 
with communicative reason and understanding, which are firmly anchored in the life-
world of speech, interaction, and socialisation.  He submits that it is the distinguishing 
feature of modern societies that instrumental and communicative reason can co-exist and 
indeed must co-exist if there is going to be anything like non-instrumental legitimacy.  
His claim is that there is evidence that they can co-exist because science, industry and 
progress in a technological sense have placed external nature at the disposition of 
humanity.  This means that from a determinate moment in the history of the unfolding of 
humanity’s productive forces, which one might locate with the scientific and industrial 
revolutions, it becomes objectively possible to overcome institutionalised material 
scarcity, i.e., poverty and entrenched stratification.  In a series of parallel but also distinct 
developments, and in anticipation of the argument developed in far more detail in the 
Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas points out that the secularisation of authority 
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that accompanies the development of science and technology leads to changes in the 
relationship between humanity and inner, human nature.  Habermas insists that these 
changes have led to a necessary and extensive revision in Weber’s rationalisation thesis.  
Weber’s thesis needs correction because from a similarly determinate moment, which one 
might locate with the Enlightenment and modernity, it becomes objectively possible to 
overcome the ideological justification of power relations in favour of more transparent 
and therefore democratic ones.  This marks a sharp departure from the line of thinking 
pursued by Hokheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlightenment.  As seen in chapter 
3, they reckon that mastery of external nature always also entails, to varying extents, the 
oppression of inner human nature.27 
According to the thesis developed in Legitimation Crisis, the problems connected 
with the colonisation of the life-world and the transformation of law into decree are not 
immediately attributable to the phenomena of capital and class, nor are they directly 
attributable to social differentiation and complexity.  The problems in question are also 
not simply matters of contingency.  They issue from what Habermas calls the system.  
Within his explanatory framework this means that in theoretical terms they result from an 
excess of systemic reason over life-world reason.  In practical terms it results in the 
mutation of parliamentary democracy into corporatism, that is, into a verrechtlichte form 
of government that is more suited to providing predictability and stability than it is to 
providing democracy and liberty.  The corporatist by-passing of the legislature through 
extra-parliamentary agreements, combined with compensatory palliatives of the Welfare 
                                                 
27Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Legitimation Crisis), part 1, chapter 3.  This clear break 
from Horkheimer and Adorno is at the same time a less obvious break from Neumann and especially 
Kirchheimer, for whom the possibility of a transcendence of interactive oppression is contingent on 
juridical reform of capitalist forms of property and the division of labour. 
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State, attest to the fact that in post-1968 North America and Western Europe, and 
especially in the pre-1989 Bundesprepublik, pre-modern modes of political integration 
are no longer viable.  At the same time, however, authentically modern ones have yet 
fully to develop.28  In Habermas’ estimation, the modern industrial democracies of the 
post-World War II period are confronted with an extremely difficult but ultimately 
resolvable task.  They cannot simply decry the blurring of private and public and the 
concomitant rise of the social, nor can they attempt to subject the economy to democratic 
control.  The first pseudo-option ignores the facticity of society and social complexity; 
the second would be tantamount to authoritarian steering.  Hence the communicative 
channels between life-world and system must be unblocked in order to act on the reality 
that collective learning and socialisation can and to a considerable extent have in practice 
kept pace with technological innovation and industrial growth.  The 2-volume Theory of 
Communicative Action (1981) constitutes his attempt to refute Weber’s rationalisation 
thesis and simultaneously move beyond the impasses he finds in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.  He reckons this can be accomplished by showing in empirical and 
theoretical terms why the transcendence of material scarcity as well as the overcoming of 
ideologically justified power relations is a collective learning process, and by 
demonstrating too that democracy is the institutional form of human collective learning. 
In the course of the trajectory from the Structural Transformation and 
Legitimation Crisis to the Theory of Communicative Action, one detects a discernible 
shift in the reference points shaping the arguments put forth.  Whilst partial 
appropriations and critical responses to Kant, Weber, Arendt, Neumann and Kirchheimer 
discretely guide the early writings, assessments of the contributions to social theory made 
                                                 
28 Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Legitimation Crisis), part 1, chapter 5. 
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by Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), G.H. Mead (1863-1931), and the functionalism of 
Talcott Parsons (1902-79, author of The Structure of Social Action, 1937) mark the 
evolution of Habermas’ work during the period of the `linguistic turn’ and thereafter.29  
What Habermas sees missing in Marxism, liberalism, Weberian sociology and first 
generation critical theory he finds to a qualified extent in the writings Durkheim, Mead, 
Parsons and other theorists largely ignored by the German thinkers shaping his early 
years as a theorist.  That conspicuously missing element is a theory of the social that does 
not reduce social action to a series of reflex responses to class conflict, psychological 
drives, or to unimportant fragments within more overarching narratives of reason (Hegel) 
or rationalisation (Weber) in history.  In Durkheim’s reflections on law, Habermas finds 
supporting evidence for his own thesis that language is more than a mere means in the 
functional mediation of co-operation and conflict.  Contrary to the theses developed by 
Foucault, Habermas is confident that linguistic communication holds the promise of 
truthful mediation and, as a consequence, eventual non-coerced agreement.  The 
implication is that real non-coerced agreement - not the fictitious version reached behind 
a veil of ignorance in hermetic isolation from others - could in principle become one of 
the principal bases of legitimacy.  If in the early writings agreement is secured in a 
political public sphere, by the time of Legitimation Crisis and the Theory of 
Communicative Action, agreement is firmly anchored in the social life-world.  Habermas 
updates his own ideas by shifting his reference points from mainly German debates on 
                                                 
29 Although Mead perhaps represents the chief pragmatist influence on the Theory of Communicative 
Action, the book is also clearly influenced by the writings of Peirce, William James (1842-1910), John 
Dewey (1859-1952) and J.L. Austin (1911-1960).  Some of these pragmatist influences are already 
discernible in Knowledge and Human Interests.   In the Theory of Communicative Action Habermas also 
cites the work of prominent ethnomethodologists, phenomenologists, developmental psychologists and the 
contributions of other sociological traditions he feels are ignored by Lukács and the Frankfurt School.     
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Marxism, Kantianism, and political republicanism, to more international debates on 
communicative rationality and sociological theory.  One of the main themes running 
through the Theory of Communicative Action is that it is possible to retain the heuristic 
value of the public sphere argument provided that its framing is substantially adjusted to 
suit the evident reality that the classical public sphere is irretrievably gone, and that the 
epistemological content of republicanism is therefore now to be sought in the practices of 
communication in the life-world.  Without discussing Arendt in any detail, Habermas 
implies that her political theory is both right and wrong.  She correctly detects a non-
instrumental dimension to politics that is threatened by technical and administrative 
processes in modern societies.  But she in effect fetishises politics by making it a timeless 
feature of the human condition that can always be brought back to life in its pre-existing 
forms, such as those prevailing in the polis or the American Revolution.  Therefore 
although her thought does not share the pathos of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, it is a 
similarly forlorn argument without a great deal of contemporary relevance.  This is due to 
the fact that a substantial part of what she refers to as politics has been absorbed into 
what Habermas, following Luhmann in both proximity and critical distance, designates as 
the system.   
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Habermas and Luhmann: System and Life-World versus 
System and Systemic Environments 
 
 
Habermas positions himself between Arendt and Luhmann by suggesting that the 
system is not ubiquitous, and indeed, cannot function without the cultural understandings 
and the communicative reason that flourishes in the life-world for reasons which will be 
explained below.  The point for the moment is that against both Arendt and the founders 
of critical theory, Habermas maintains that society can be conceived of as being 
comprised of the system and the life-world.  In his estimation this is more nuanced and 
helpful in explanatory terms than insisting on the predominance of the political or the 
social, or the prevalence of mimetic reason versus instrumental reason.  Thus although 
Habermas is critical of Weber and criticises his theory of social action, he also maintains 
that one cannot simply ignore the phenomena diagnosed by him: the political public 
sphere of ascendant liberalism has collapsed, and power-oriented political parties have 
occupied the space thereby vacated for the foreseeable future.   This does not mean that 
full-blown systems theory must be embraced, however.  For the author of the Theory of 
Communicative Action, the non-instrumental dimension of reality that Arendt finds in 
politics and Adorno discerns in aesthetic reason now has fairly solid if diffused social 
bases, as Durkheim convincingly shows.  The implication is that the mediation functions 
of the former political public sphere have been replaced by systemic operations, and by a 
social public sphere, i.e., the life-world.30  
                                                 
30 Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action), Volume II, chapter 6. 
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 According to Habermas’ reading of Durkheim, law was once embedded in 
traditional institutions such as the church.   As political authority was gradually 
secularised, legal institutions and juridical reasoning were de-coupled from religion and 
tradition, and law emerged as a medium of communication with its own norms.  After 
passing through the stage of being religiously embedded, legal norms became state-
juridical in the early modern period examined in the Structural Transformation.  Since 
then they have evolved beyond their state-juridical instantiation, which means that they 
are now firmly anchored in society and the life-world.31  These developments in the 
structure of legal reasoning and understanding correspond to the transition from 
mechanical to organic solidarity charted in Durkheim’s sociology.  Readers familiar with 
the broad outlines of his theory will know that for Durkheim, integration in traditional 
society results from rituals and customs which do not allow individuals much social 
space for autonomous reflection and development.  Hence in a manner that may be 
somewhat counter-intuitive to those familiar with Tönnies’ (1855-1936) distinction 
between older forms of Gemeinschaft (community) and modern Gesellschaft (society), 
Durkheim shows that solidarity in pre-modern political communities was for the most 
part mechanical.  By contrast, modern societies allow individuals to develop at the same 
time that the societies secure the foundations of post-traditional sources of solidarity.  
This point is of central importance for Habermas, for it indicates to him that in a modern 
context the differentiation of individual and authority, institutionalised as the separation 
of personal morality and positive law, is compatible with and even promotes rational 
modes of integration, that is, it points to the thesis that differentiation need not be 
                                                 
31Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action), Volume II, pp. 258-62. 
 36 
synonymous with fragmentation or the instances of domination usually associated with 
alienation.   
Reading Durkheim and Mead in light of the relatively stabilised and to varying 
degrees corporatist socio-political arrangements of Western Europe in the 1970s, 
Habermas concludes that social integration and system integration are propelled by 
different rationalities and discrete institutional realities.  The influence of Parsons, and by 
extension of Luhmann, comes into focus here, though it is worth noting both thinkers are 
often criticised by Habermas for the action-theoretical and communicative-hermeneutical 
deficit in their respective theories.  Habermas maintains that knowledge of the processes 
structuring systemic integration is best aggregated on the basis of the perspective of an 
external observer, as Luhmann intimates.  But knowledge of the processes securing social 
integration in the life-world is always produced by participants involved in those very 
dynamics; it is therefore a qualitatively different kind of knowledge than the knowledge 
experts have of systems.  These citizens are reflexive in ways that systems can never be.  
The major problem inherent in the functionalist and systems theoretical approaches, as 
already signalled in Legitimation Crisis, is that they offer no remedies when system and 
life-world cease to communicate.32  Habermas suggests that Weber is correct to regard 
rationalisation as being bound up with increasing social complexity and what almost 
inevitably goes with it - systemic imperatives requiring calculated predictability in the 
fields of law, economy, administration, and beyond.  But what Weber leaves out of 
consideration for the most part is that rationalisation also opens up possibilities for the 
differentiation of individual personality and the transmission of cultural values on fully 
                                                 
32Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action), Volume I, pp. 232, 335-56, 
488, and Volume II, pp. 20-3. 
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secular and humanist bases.  According to the interpretation offered in the Theory of 
Communicative Action, Weber’s theory of social action is excessively centred on the 
means-oriented pursuit of goals, which is the unsurprising consequence of a 
methodological approach that describes itself as a Herrschaftssoziologie.  The theoretical 
parallel to an impoverished account of social action is a one-sided approach to law which 
regards legality as the legal-rational legitimation of force.33   
Habermas notes that functionalism and systems theory absorb what is generally 
correct in Weber.  This includes the Weberian theses acknowledging complexity and 
differentiation as hallmarks of modern society, and the related claim that differentiation is 
accompanied by various instances of integration.  But in his estimation they also tend to 
absorb what is faulty in Weber, which they do in two ways.  First, they replicate his 
diagnosis of social action as the institutionalised competitive strategy of individuals, 
parties and states.  Second, whereas Weber for the most part reduces legality to legal-
rational legitimation, Parsons and Luhmann reduce legitimacy to codified procedure and 
what is necessary to produce social order.  They thereby make legitimacy a function of 
stability and equilibrium, and omit crucial considerations about what makes legitimacy 
legitimate beyond what is temporarily effective.  In insisting that law is just one of many 
differentiated social systems rather than a conduit between citizens and government, 
Luhmann, in particular, fails to recognise the rational and democratic qualities of modern 
law.  For Habermas, legitimacy must be a function of communicative action understood 
as the progressive institutionalisation of discursively redeemed norms.  He believes that 
the normative deficit alluded to can assume extreme forms in systems theory, where 
                                                 
33 Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action), Volume I, pp. 377-86.  
Habermas articulates a diametrically opposed theory of legality in Between the Facts and the Norms, as 
will be seen. 
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social action is often dismissed as the corollary of what is held to be the dubious idea of a 
social actor naturally endowed with a predictable array of pre-social anthropological 
attributes (tool-making, speaking, politically engaged, etc.).  On this account the social 
action is explained in terms of what social actors do, which is nothing other than what 
they already by definition are: they make tools, speak, take part in politics, and so on.  
From a systems theoretical perspective this is a non-explanation.  From Habermas’ 
perspective, and despite his own emphasis on the need for social inquiry to be 
interpretative, Weber tends to absolutise the perspective of the external observer, so that 
quantitative categorisation gets the better of qualitative understanding.  Habermas insists 
that this methodological individualism is seemingly transformed but really only re-
articulated in functionalism and systems theory, both of which reproduce the defect of 
exaggerating the role of external observation in sociological explanation.34   
By 1981 he modifies this position by implying that when the life-world and 
system become de-coupled, a crisis of communicative rationality ensues.  He asserts that 
such normative crises cannot be resolved by systemic adjustments to their respective 
environmental irritations alone.  That is because if it can be said that systems progress, 
life-worlds learn, and, in evolutionary terms, progress and learning are not synonymous.  
Learning is in this sense is non-instrumental, collective, and interactive, and cannot be 
established according to the abstractions of an external observer.  Legitimacy, as opposed 
to legitimation, is therefore guaranteed by citizen participation in the life-world, which 
embraces all individuals despite whatever negative experiences they may have in their 
contacts with systemic realities.  The claim that modern democracies cannot rely on 
                                                 
34 Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action), Volume II, pp. 309-57 and 
pp. 390-94. 
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social systems mutually to self-adjust is a central part of Habermas’ argument.  In his 
estimation it follows that democratic states cannot be blithely confident about the 
capacity of government experts to correct communicative rationality crises.  In crisis 
situations the channels between system and life-world must be re-opened, and the 
impetus for this has to come from the critique of daily life and its implications for 
policy.35  This argument is put forth in still more affirmative terms in Between Facts and 
Norms (1992). 
 In this work he explicitly states that this-worldly transcendence is indeed possible, 
but contingent upon the realisation of radical democracy.36  Yet his radical democracy is 
not direct democracy, or social democracy, nor the juridical socialism favoured by 
Kirchheimer and Neumann.  It appears to be a kind of republican democracy in which 
key areas of everyday life such as the economy are not subject to political control.  Here 
one glimpses the political indeterminacy of the theory of communicative action, and the 
ambiguity of the Habermasian paradigm of modernity in more general terms.  
Communicative action yields communicative influence on the system, but cannot exercise 
communicative power as such.  At first glance this looks like a reformulation of the 
Kantian dimension of the argument in the Structural Transformation, combined with 
select concessions to the social systemic injunction against politicising the economy and 
judiciary.  But Habermas claims that the democracy sustained by communicative action 
in the life-world is so radical as to contain an anarchistic dimension, i.e., something 
                                                 
35 Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Theory of Communicative Action), Volume II, pp. 440-62, pp. 
471-76, and pp. 480-91.  There are clearly definite points of converge between the critique of daily life 
analysed in the previous chapter and the theory of the life-world developed in Legitimation Crisis, the 
Theory of Communicative Action, and Between the Facts and the Norms.  Although these points cannot be 
drawn out in any detail here, it might be noted in passing that it is the critique of instrumental reason that 
forms their common matrix, bearing in mind that for Habermas the critique of instrumental reason itself 
needs to be transformed into a critique of functional reason.  This point will be addressed in the conclusion. 
36 Faktizität und Geltung (Between the Facts and the Norms), pp.13 and 19. 
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which was presumably absent from the classical public sphere.37  In the at that time 
newly arrived post-Cold War political climate, he seems confident that the tendencies he 
had previously diagnosed in terms of colonisation of the life-world and the de-coupling 
of life-world and system can and in most cases are overcome by modern law.  The 
explanation why law can accomplish the tasks Habermas credits it with is that the 
mediation between life-world and system is not merely a more recent version of the 
mediation of the private and public spheres.38  He suggests that if the private sphere was 
not completely abolished with the rise of the social, the concept of the ‘private sphere’ is 
nonetheless a misleading term when used to describe the character of non-systemic 
communication and intimacy in a post-1989 world.  Just as the contract presupposes a 
valid state that makes the contractual moment of agreement possible, which is one 
explanation why one cannot provide the grounds of political obligation via contract, 
communication presupposes a community of speakers who understand one another.  This 
is why complex modern societies need not resort to force or rely on systemic self-steering 
when mediating between private and public rights and interests.  He reckons that whilst 
resorting to force is the hallmark of traditional society, the theory of systemic self-
steering ignores key aspects of normative evolution and constitutional regeneration.39  
However, Habermas cautions, it must nonetheless be borne in mind that communicative 
action has its limits - there can be no question of the life-world colonising the system.   
Communication would inevitably turn into oppressive, centralised steering if the life-
world was to be entrusted with organising the mediation of humanity and external nature.  
This means that not only does Habermas not entertain the possibility of political control 
                                                 
37Faktizität und Geltung (Between the Facts and the Norms), p. 10. 
38 Faktizität und Geltung (Between the Facts and the Norms), pp. 21, 49-52 and p. 527. 
39 Zur Verfassung Europas (On Europe’s Constitution), pp. 39-47. 
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of the economy; he insists that radical democracy must actually dispense with the very 
idea if, that is, communication and not steering is to remain the basis of legitimacy in 
post-traditional, democratic states.  Communication may break, inflect upon and re-
channel power, but it may not become legitimate power (authority).  It follows that if 
communication becomes democratic power, communication would in effect be converted 
into ideological manipulation – in his estimation political control of the economy would 
indeed bring about this structural transformation of communication.  Hence he discounts 
the possibility that a libertarian or juridical form of socialism could organise the 
mediation of humanity and external nature.  Any attempt to do so would be fatal for what 
Arendt calls politics and what he designates as communication and interaction.40  This 
would presumably result in the demise of the modernist individual human nature that 
emerges from the separation of law and morality.  In Habermas’s opinion such juridical 
reform would probably reverse the very learning processes that have made radical 
democracy a realistic possibility.41 
 This brings us to the crux of the matter.  It seems that from the time of the 
separation of work and interaction theorised in Knowledge and Human Interests, which 
subsequently evolves into the distinction between system and life-world and/or system 
and civil society in later writings, Habermas is aware of the theoretical proximity 
between his account of communicative action and certain features of systems theory.  On 
the one hand he embraces the thesis that systemic differentiation and increasing social 
complexity are not necessarily de-stabilising processes, because, in his view, these very 
                                                 
40 Hence the break with Arendt, except in terms of from her praise of revolution, is not quite as decisive as 
it may sometimes seem.  Moreover, it would appear that Kirchheimer and Neumann’s views on the 
political potential of bold legal action are retained, on the one hand, whereas the link they make between 
active juridical intervention and democratic socialism is severed, on the other.    
41 Faktizität und Geltung (Between the Facts and the Norms), p. 361-4. 
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processes also engender diverse modes of integration as they unfold.  His sociological 
commitment to this thesis is nonetheless partially offset by the simultaneously held 
normative conviction that crises of legitimacy will result if social systems detach 
themselves from social actors and political citizens (Luhmann has no doubts that that has 
been the reality for quite some time).  This is why Habermas insists on the co-
instantiation of the system and life-world, and the normative and political priority of the 
latter over the former (lest one give up on the idea that modern societies are complex but 
also governed democratically).  It can thus be said that he tempers the potential normative 
deficits of the systems-theoretical approach with communicative and hermeneutical 
inputs.  The latter, in turn, are presented in his writings as aspects of what a humanist 
political theory should look like once it has successfully discarded the baggage of the 
idealist legacy.  In principle this is a political theory capable of rising to the anti-humanist 
challenge of post-structuralism and systems theory.42 
 Habermas tends to suggest that if negative dialectics is really disenchanted, 
negative idealism, systems theory is cybernetic and meta-biological in approach rather 
than properly sociological.  Hence he maintains that although it was necessary to move 
social philosophical reflection beyond idealism in all its forms, the result should not be a 
simultaneous abandonment of key anthropological categories such as language, 
communication and autonomy.  He correctly suspects that without these normative 
                                                 
42 This has not always been the case.  In the early 1970s Suhrkamp published a book with Habermas and 
Luhmann’s respective critiques of one other, highlighting their different approaches to social theory.  If not 
exactly conciliatory, the tone of the exchange seemed geared toward a possible convergence on key points.  
See Habermas and Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie - Was leistet die 
Systemforshung?, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1974.  Given that this book was published very soon after 
Legitimation Crisis, it is possible that at this time Habermas was fairly sympathetic to a systems theoretical 
analysis of late capitalist democratic states.  As has been suggested in preceding pages, however, the 
Theory of Communicative Action and Between the Facts and the Norms seem to reject any possible 
rapprochement.  It is suggested in this chapter that despite this ostensible repudiation, Habermas 
nonetheless incorporates aspects of systems theory into his work.       
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foundations, the state becomes a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and reason must 
be instrumental.  This would amount to a last minute comeback by Weber against 
Durkheim and Mead.  The theory of communicative action adopts sociological 
perspectives on complexity, integration, and differentiation, and combines these with 
selected bits of rather traditional political theory concerning agreement and 
understanding.  The fact that developmental psychology and discourse ethics are also at 
times enlisted does not alter this conservative political orientation, even if Habermas 
chooses to call it radical.  It thus seems fair to ask two questions.  If one is going to retain 
some aspects of anthropological humanism in accordance with the implicit thesis that the 
legitimacy of the legal state is imperilled without them, why not re-elaborate them in 
directions that push normative assumptions to the limits reached by negative dialectics 
and systems theory, instead of trying to make them natural rights and thereby ignore the 
fact that post-democracy (Crouch et al) is a reality and not a spectre vaguely haunting 
Europe?43  Does supplementing the system/life-world distinction with universal speech 
pragmatics and selected aspects of Parsons suffice to transcend the philosophy of 
consciousness?  Luhmann notes that dichotomies such as subject/object and life-
world/system can be conceptualised in terms of the reality of form rather than in terms of 
the illusion of form and the reality of essence.  For him this means dispensing with 
subject/object and life-world/system in favour of internal-external and 
system/environment.  His point is that one can discern the rationality of systems in their 
contingent relations with their respective environments instead of speculating about the 
rationality and motives of actors.  Stated slightly differently, one can observe that 
                                                 
43 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy, Cambridge, CUP, 2004.  Also see Massimo Salvadori, Democrazie 
senza democrazia, Bari, Laterza, 2009, and Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen 
Kapitalismus, Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2013.   
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rationality is a property of systems rather than of actors.  It follows that individual 
autonomy - at least at this historical juncture - has more to do with adjusting to 
uncertainty than it does with the realisation of Aristotelian (political) or Habermasian 
(communicative) essences.  The corollary is that democracy has more to do with neo-
liberal governance and austerity than it has to do with collective self-determination or 
popular constitutive power.  There is no way to alter this without first confronting it 
squarely.  Luhmann intimates that communication takes place between social systems 
and not between systemic structures and life-world actors.  In systems-theoretical terms 
there is no direct communication between individuals, political system and society, and, 
moreover, the channels of communication do not culminate in some meta-social 
institution such as an updated version of the Hegelian state.44  Existing forms of 
legitimacy are therefore achieved in a series of precarious and highly contingent 
adjustments between systems and environments and not those between citizens and 
governments via a plurality of ultimately interconnected life-worlds.  If one favours an 
altogether different praxis of legitimacy one must first grapple with the plausibility of this 
approach and the juridical issues that it raises.45 
 Luhmann uses the term autopoiesis to describe the processes through which laws 
and rights operate on the basis that societies need them.  Laws and rights are therefore the 
products of a juridical system which functions as a series of closed, self-referential 
processes in conjunction with social systems of value (economy), truth (natural science), 
                                                 
44 Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft (The Politics of Society), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2002, chapter 6, 
and Das Recht der Gesellschaft (The Law of Society), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp,1993, chapter 9.  
45 Luhmann, `Erkenntnis als Konstruktion’, in Oliver Jahraus (ed.), Niklas Luhmann: Aufsätze und Reden, 
pp. 237-8, and Soziale Systeme (Social Systems, 1984), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1987, chapters 5 and 11-12.  
For an excellent exegetical overview see Michael King and Chris Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of 
Politics and Law, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.  
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power (politics), intimacy (family), belief (churches), and so forth.  Hence society can be 
analysed as an ensemble of systems that communicate through codes rather than a 
collective political centre or its individual counterpart - human speech.  This argument is 
first sketched in Social Systems (1984), and then elaborated in the two-volume The 
Society of Society (1997), in which Luhmann explains that social systems generate sense 
to the extent that they can define their respective boundaries, reduce complexity, and 
meet expectations to varying degrees.  In his view it is thus more rigorous to speak of 
system rationality than value rationality or inter-subjectivity and communicative action.46  
Although there is no space here to provide a detailed exposition and critique of the 
systems-theoretical approach, some may regard it as more consistent than the theory of 
communicative action in terms of the deconstruction of what have become highly 
problematic assumptions about the nature of human communication, agency, and political 
democracy.  Habermas may wish to dismiss the conclusion that the end of idealism and 
the philosophy of consciousness may also signal the twilight of the life-world and 
politically relevant social interaction, but from Luhmann’s perspective it is virtually 
irresistible.  Systems theory eliminates assumptions about social action and the teleology 
of citizen agreement in those crucial instances of speech and understanding that the 
communicative action approach tries to safeguard in order to shore up the humanistic 
ideal of rational legitimacy. 
 Somewhat surprisingly, given the critical tone of this chapter, there is an 
underlying utopian dimension to both Habermas and Luhmann.  They agree that 
legitimacy is based on knowledge rather than on merely more and less stable 
configurations of interest aggregation and welfare distribution.  Luhmann indicates that 
                                                 
46 Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (The Society of Society), pp. 1016-1036. 
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under existing socio-economic and legal arrangements, it is the very tentative knowledge 
that systems have of each other through codes, rather than the understandings citizens 
have with each other through speech and communicative action.  Hence for both thinkers 
what matters is the specific kind of knowledge that defines legitimate law.  It may well be 
that in some regards the analytical triumphs of systems theory represent a rather pyrrhic 
victory over the problems of humanism that are strikingly evident in the work of 
Habermas and other democratic theorists.  Just because the alternative to epistemological 
and political metaphysics is not the late democracy achieved by attempting constantly to 
re-couple life-world and system under the directives of capital and austerity, it does not 
necessarily follow that the real alternative is systemic autopoiesis.  In conclusion, one has 
to be thankful to both thinkers for the critical questions they raise.  At first glance they 
appear to be implacable theoretical enemies.  Reading them together, however, one finds, 
in nuce, a succinct statement of the most acute challenges to meaningful politics and 
legitimate democracy in the twenty-first century. 
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